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Abstract 
We have examined the fiscal consolidation episodes in a group of OECD countries from 
2009 to 2014. The range of the estimated short-term fiscal multiplier runs from 1.2% to 2% 
of GDP, larger than those obtained in more “normal times”, implying that the contractionary 
effect has been greater in depressed environments. Nevertheless, we have also found that 
revenue measures have a higher and more persistent real impact than expenditure 
measures, which is more consistent with the literature and suggests that expenditure cuts 
are less harmful for the economy than tax hikes. 
Keywords: fiscal multipliers, fiscal policy, crisis management. 
JEL Classification: E12, E62, E63, H12. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Entre 2009 y 2014, los países de la OCDE han acometido un importante proceso de 
consolidación fiscal. En el presente trabajo examinamos el efecto de este proceso sobre la 
actividad económica. Los multiplicadores fiscales de corto plazo se estiman entre el 1,2 % y 
el 2 % del PIB, mayores que los obtenidos en «tiempos normales», lo que implica que el 
efecto contractivo ha sido mayor en un entorno de actividad económica más deprimida. No 
obstante, encontramos que las medidas de consolidación sobre los ingresos públicos tienen 
un efecto mayor y más persistente que las medidas sobre el gasto, un resultado coherente 
con la literatura que sugiere que la composición del ajuste es relevante para el cálculo del 
efecto de las medidas fiscales en la economía. 
Palabras clave: multiplicadores fiscales, política fiscal, crisis económica. 
Códigos JEL: E12, E62, E63, H12. 
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1 Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the fall in revenues, the fiscal stimulus and the 
realisation of contingent liabilities, mostly related to the support provided to the financial 
system, triggered a considerable increase in the public deficit in advanced economies, 
reaching 9% of GDP and a debt ratio over 90% in 2009. The long-term costs of high public 
debt are well known from the literature, explaining why so many countries subsequently 
committed to fiscal adjustment programs to ensure the sustainability of their public finances.   
By 2015 the deficits have been reduced significantly, but public debt to GDP ratios in 
the advanced economies have still not stabilised and stand at levels not seen since the end of 
World War II. Nevertheless, the fiscal policy debate has focused on the short-term effects of 
fiscal consolidation and, consequently, on the appropriate speed of debt reduction and the 
composition between revenue and expenditure. This paper analyses the effects of fiscal 
consolidation for a group of OECD countries in the period 2009-2014 and compares it with 
previous consolidation periods.  
There are several possible reasons why the current episode of large fiscal 
retrenchment is so very different from previous ones. Six years after the onset of the crisis, 
output gaps and cyclical unemployment still loom large in many advanced economies. 
Monetary policy is very expansionary, but given the zero lower bound of interest rates financial 
conditions remain tight. Moreover, a synchronised fiscal adjustment across several major 
economies may adversely impact the recovery. In fact Blanchard and Leigh (2013) have 
already shown that a negative relationship between fiscal consolidation forecasts and 
subsequent growth forecast errors has been responsible for a slower than expected recovery 
in a number of economies during the period 2010-2011. 
Empirically, the problem is to correctly identify the effects of fiscal policy on output. 
When analysing cross-country evidence, a standard method has been to use the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) to approximate discretionary changes in fiscal policy. From 
another standpoint, traditional VAR methods assume that fiscal changes are uncorrelated 
with other determinants of output. However, as pointed out by Romer and Romer (2010), 
these fiscal variables may include non-policy changes correlated with output. That is 
particularly relevant when using annual data, since agents may be responding to the fiscal 
change within the year and that correlation would bias the analysis against the contractionary 
effects of fiscal consolidation.  
To address these identification problems the literature has used historical records – 
the narrative approach – to look for fiscal policy actions that are aimed at reducing the budget 
deficit rather than in response to current economic conditions. To that end we have 
constructed a dataset of government spending cuts and revenue increases from a broad set 
of policy documents for a group of advanced economies.  
Alesina et al. (2015) analysed historical records up to 2007 to simulate multi-year 
fiscal plans in 2009-2013. In our case we have looked to the cost of fiscal consolidation for a 
wider set of advanced economies using a new dataset from the period 2009-2014. The 
collected measures are ex-post outcomes and we do not try to separate the expected from 
the unexpected component of the fiscal change. Against this background, we are able to 
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compare our data with the fiscal consolidation records in more “normal times” (1979-2009) 
previously studied in the literature (Guajardo et al., 2014). 
In keeping with Keynesian models, most empirical results have shown a fall in output 
after a rise in taxes or a cut in government spending. That would be consistent with a short-
term spending multiplier that lies between 0.6 and 1.8 (Ramey, 2011), although multi-country 
models give a multiplier of less than 1 independently of the fiscal instrument (Kilponen et al., 
2015). But a line of the literature has highlighted the importance of composition between 
revenue and expenditure when studying consolidation efforts and the existence of non-
Keynesian effects. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were the first to show that large expenditure-
based fiscal adjustments could be expansionary. More recently, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
found that spending cuts were much more effective than tax increases on large fiscal 
consolidations, and that they were associated with economic expansion across a panel of 
OECD countries. Significant fiscal consolidation today (particularly if implemented with large 
expenditure cuts) may reduce the need for future fiscal action, raising the current confidence 
of households and firms. Thus when this expectation channel dominates the pure multiplier 
effect, consolidation will have a positive effect on output. Given the scale of the fiscal efforts 
across countries in the wake of the global crisis and the sizeable revenue increases, it is an 
open issue if there is any evidence of “expansionary fiscal contractions” when considering the 
most recent time period. 
The next section of the paper describes some characteristics of the fiscal 
consolidation taking place after 2009, showing that the efforts have been higher than in 
previous episodes. We also present a test of exogeneity of fiscal actions compared with 
standard CAPB measures. Section 3 reports the main econometric results. We estimate the 
dynamic fiscal multiplier on output in a single equation specification and compare it with 
alternative VAR specifications. We also report the differences between revenue and 
expenditure, considering only large consolidations. The evidence points to higher fiscal 
multiplier effects after the financial crisis and to higher and more persistent impact of revenue-
based rather than expenditure-based actions. The latter evidence goes in the same direction 
than the one reported by Alesina et al. (2015). Moreover, we found that revenue multipliers 
are larger while expenditure multipliers become non-significant when only large consolidations 
are considered.  
Section 4 presents two relevant extensions. First, given the interdependence of 
monetary and fiscal policy, we analyse whether it has any significant influence on the 
estimated fiscal multipliers. Changes in policy interest rates are shaping the magnitude of the 
fiscal actions, especially when the most recent period, affected by the zero lower bound, is 
excluded. Second, we study if there are any specific fiscal effects for the euro area countries, 
since they have been subject to a common monetary policy and fiscal framework. The 
confidence channel in presence of a financial stress environment may explain the lower real 
effects of fiscal actions in the Euro Area. To conclude, Section 5 presents a summary of the 
main results together with some open issues for future research. 
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2 Characterising the fiscal consolidation after the financial crisis: 2009-2014 
Over the last five years many advanced and emerging economies have been involved in a 
process of fiscal consolidation. The main objective was to reduce the fiscal deficit that 
increased significantly as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. For example, the 
average discretionary fiscal stimulus in the G-20 economies was around 2% of GDP in 2009 
and 2010 and their average fiscal deficit reached 6.8% in 2010 (see IMF, 2010). In 
consequence at the Toronto Summit in 2009 they committed to fiscal plans that would halve 
deficits by 2013.  
We follow the historical approach proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) to identify 
fiscal consolidations after the financial crisis.1
The sample includes the revenue-based and expenditure-based fiscal actions taken 
by 27 economies in the period 2009-2014 (see Appendix 1, Table A.1). These are 25 OECD 
countries plus Latvia and Lithuania which are now euro area countries. Thus, the majority are 
advanced countries, but there are also two emerging economies (Mexico and Turkey). In total 
we have identified 101 cases of action where these countries took some budgetary 
measures. During the period 2010-2014, more than 70% of the economies included in the 
sample were immersed in fiscal consolidation. The median of the adjustments is 1% of GDP 
and the average is 1.76% of GDP, with a standard deviation of 0.18 pp. The range runs from 
-3.0% to 9.75% of GDP (see Figure 1). The negative figures correspond to the expiration of 
temporary fiscal measures, for example Estonia in 2010 and 2011, and the figures over 9% of 
GDP correspond to Estonia and Latvia in 2009. 
 The historical episode narrative aims to 
separate policy changes from those arising from non-policy developments. The set of 
documents reviewed for this purpose relies on Stability and Convergence Programmes 
submitted annually to the European Commission, national budgets, OECD Economic Surveys 
and IMF Staff Reports, as well as national sources such as the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) and several Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Where possible we have 
reviewed the measures announced, using the most up-to-date document available, and have 
checked those documents using the retrospective analysis included in the IMF’s Article IV 
reviews and in the OECD’s “Restoring Public Finances” documents. All the budgetary 
measures are fully credible and implemented in the year assigned by the official documents.  
  
                                                                            
1. We identify fiscal policy changes using historical documents as in Devries et al. (2011). 
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Figure 1. Narrative episodes of fiscal consolidation 2009-2014:  
Size distribution 
 
 
The current fiscal adjustment episodes are very different from the previous ones 
studied by Guajardo et al. (2014). During the period 1978-2009 the fiscal adjustments of 15 
advanced economies averaged 0.99% with a standard deviation of 0.94. Thus, although the 
number of observations and of years in our sample is smaller, it contains more countries, the 
average size of fiscal consolidation is larger and it has lower variance. If we define large 
consolidations as consolidation efforts amounting to more than 1.5% of GDP, as in Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010), we find a total of 67 large fiscal consolidations. 
Most observations in the sample are concentrated between 2011 and 2013 (see 
Figure 2). The 2009 data are driven by the Baltic economies that suffered a sudden stop and 
a credit crunch in 2008. In 2009 they started to consolidate very significantly (an average of 
8%), in a year dominated by spending cuts (see Figure 3). In 2010 there was an increase in 
the number of countries tightening their budgets, including the euro area economies subject 
to market pressure. Finally, in 2014 the pace of fiscal consolidation abated, with fewer 
countries making consolidation efforts and expenditure cuts exceeding tax increases.  
Figure 2. Narrative episodes of fiscal consolidation, 1978-2014 
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Figure 3. Average size of narrative fiscal consolidations 
 
 
 
The composition of fiscal adjustments is critical for their effects on the economy. 
Figures 2 and 3 show that the adjustments made in the 2009-2014 period were fairly equally 
split between tax-based and expenditure-based actions. However, our sample contains 
several examples of important consolidations affecting both expenditure and revenue, so it 
will be crucial to estimate the impact of both types of consolidations jointly. This observation 
contrasts with the fiscal adjustment episodes examined by Alesina et al. (2015). They find that 
most consolidation efforts made in the 2009-2013 period have been based on expenditure 
cuts. Although we have not been able to compare their dataset sources with ours, we have 
found that the calculated total consolidation is fairly similar for six out of the eleven countries 
their dataset contains. The starkest difference occurs in Spain, where we have detected a 
total consolidation of 10.5 % of GDP, fairly balanced between expenditure cuts and tax hikes, 
while Alesina and co-authors computed a total consolidation of more than 15% of GDP, 
almost entirely based on adjustments in expenditure. We consider our measures more 
accurate. There is a general consensus that fiscal consolidation in Spain has been relatively 
balanced, with some authors putting more weight on the revenue side (Hernández de Cos 
and López Rodríguez, 2014). Moreover, with respect to 2012-2013, several official 
documents identify a balanced path of consolidation, with total consolidation amounting to 
around 6,5%-7,5% of GDP (see, for example IMF, 2013), in contrast with more than 9% of 
anticipated and unanticipated measures in Alesina et al. (2015). 
Lastly, we have also observed significant differences from one region to another. 
Overall, advanced non-stressed euro area and emerging economies are the regions that have 
consolidated less, whereas Baltic and stressed euro area countries are the ones that have 
made most efforts. In relative terms, taxes have been raised more in the emerging countries 
and expenditure has been cut more in the Baltic and the advanced non-European countries.  
2.1 Comparison of fiscal policy measures 
We have said that the conventional approach to measure policy-driven changes in fiscal 
policy is through the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) that excludes changes in 
fiscal variables induced by business cycle fluctuations. To have a uniform indicator we 
selected the variable constructed by the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor database. In total there are 101 
cases where these 27 countries took budgetary actions as measured by CAPB. The median 
of the adjustments is 0.77% of GDP and the average is 1.2%, with a standard deviation of 
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0.12 pp. Thus, in general, the CAPB adjustments are smaller than those identified in the 
narrative approach.  
Before analysing the real effects of the fiscal narrative measures we compare them 
with the more standard CAPB measures. Figure 4 plots the observations of the two fiscal 
consolidation indicators in the period 2009-2014. There are no major discrepancies observed 
between the two and in principle it would be impossible to say which measure provides a 
more reliable identification. However, we have found a total of eight episodes with large 
differences, defined as more than 3 pp of difference between the two approaches. And we 
have identified five large one-off accounting measures that could explain the inaccuracies in 
the CAPB (Ireland 2009, Lithuania 2010, Hungary 2011, Spain 2012 and Slovakia 2013). 
Figure 4. Narrative episodes vs. CAPB: 2009-2014 
 
 
 
The econometric findings for the period before 2009 are that the narrative episodes 
are more exogenous to output than the CAPB.2
 
  But if the financial crisis period is included, 
the CAPB measure may possibly be more accurate. In order to check for contemporaneous 
orthogonality with output, we perform a test of weak exogeneity of both the CAPB and the 
narrative measures. Following Guajardo et al. (2014) we construct a measure of economic 
surprises, based on the IMF’s GDP forecast revisions. We define the economic news index 
(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) as the log-difference between GDP at time t in the October World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) of year t and GDP at time t of the WEO at time t-1 for each country. We perform the 
following regression: 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡+ 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                (1) 
 
where, ∆𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the fiscal consolidation measure (CAPB or narrative-based), 𝜇𝑖 is an 
unobservable country-fixed effect and 𝜆𝑡 is a common year effect for all economies. In order 
to avoid potential small-sample bias, we merge our sample with the 1978-2009 period, giving 
                                                                            
2. See, for example, Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013), and Jordá and Taylor (2013). 
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373 observations for 15 economies that had consolidation episodes in both periods.3 4
Table 1 presents the results. The 𝛽 coefficient of the news index on the narrative 
measure equation is negative and only weakly significant, while the coefficient on the CAPB 
equation is positive and strongly significant. This result is consistent with that obtained for the 
pre-crisis period. Moreover, the explanatory power of the narrative-based measures (0.26) is 
lower than that of the CAPB measures (0.48), supporting the theory of the greater exogeneity 
of the narrative-based approach to contemporaneous changes to output movements. In 
addition, when we perform the same test for narrative-based revenue and expenditure, we 
find that the coefficient related to the tax changes is near zero, it is not significant and it is less 
correlated with output than with government spending changes. The greater exogeneity of tax 
changes signals that spending actions may respond to tax actions or other variables 
correlated with output, and therefore that revenue actions will be more help in the 
identification strategy. Another avenue, as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), would be to rely on 
specific government spending items that do not respond to economic events.     
 This 
exercise does not test for orthogonality with past (and future) output developments. In fact, 
the current fiscal actions are likely to be correlated with past large fiscal deficits and will be 
used as instruments to predict output movements.  
Table 1. An exogeneity test of fiscal policy changes (1978-2014) 
 Equation: ∆𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
                                                                            
3. The simple contemporaneous correlation between the surprises on output and CAPB change for the 2009-2014 
period is 0.59. The correlation with the narrative measure is –0.11. 
4. The 15 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
β coefficient -0.120 0.254 -0.037 -0.082
[0.067]* [0.081]*** [0.032] [0.039]*
Observations 373 371 373 373
No. of countries 15 15 15 15
R2 0.256 0.482 0.205 0.228
Note: country and time-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Narrative fiscal 
consolidations
CAPB Narrative revenue 
consolidations
Narrative expenditure 
consolidations
Dependent variable: ΔFit
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3  The estimated effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity  
The estimation strategy first examines the output effect on a single equation specification and 
latter on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In order to make the fiscal multipliers 
comparable across specifications we normalize the fiscal change so that the CAPB ratio rises 
by 1% on impact. In the VAR model, we will report the short-term fiscal multiplier after one 
year and medium-term fiscal multiplier after four years. The first section presents the results 
for the aggregated fiscal measures and analyses the real effects before and after the financial 
crisis. The second section presents the composition results, splitting the fiscal actions 
between revenues and expenditures, and considers also large fiscal consolidations as 
defended by the non-keynesian view. 
3.1 Fiscal multipliers 
Following the empirical literature in this area we  estimate the effect of fiscal consolidation on 
a single-equation specification that regresses real output growth (∆𝑌𝑖𝑡) on lagged output 
growth and the contemporaneous values and lags of the fiscal changes (∆𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑠). It takes the 
following form: 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡+ ∑ 𝛾𝑠∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑠2𝑠=1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑠∆𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑠2𝑠=0 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                   (2) 
 
Including past output allows us to control for the state of the economy in each 
country and thus helps to estimate the discretionary part of fiscal action. As is standard in the 
panel data approach, the estimation includes country-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, and 
based on the information criteria we choose two lags in the dynamic specification.5
Denoting ∆𝐹𝑖𝑡 the CAPB-based fiscal measures, the estimation by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) of the regression coefficients would be biased by several factors. First, the 
presence of an unobservable country-fixed effect would be correlated with the error term. In 
order to deal with country heterogeneity, we will estimate our set of parameters using a fixed-
effect estimator, although this estimator will be biased under the presence of the lagged 
output on the right-hand side for a small T specification. Second, if there is endogeneity in the 
CAPB measures it will be correlated with the error term, and therefore an instrumental 
variables approach should be used. In particular, we use a two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
estimator with our exogenous narrative measures as an instrument for the CAPB. Third, when 
the number of observations per country is small (a problem present mainly in the 2009-2014 
sample) a Nickell bias related to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term is more likely to be found. Against this background, this bias will overestimate 
the negative sign of the fiscal multiplier. To overcome this problem, we use a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. However, the small number of countries in our sample 
precludes us from using the full amount of moment restrictions available, i.e. all the lags of the 
dependent variable (and the CAPB) as instruments, and in consequence we use the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator. 
 
                                                                            
5. GDP data taken from the OECD Economic Outlook (Nov 2014) and Eurostat. 
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Our fourth specification is a natural variation of the first one. We run a three-vector 
auto-regression model (VAR) with the change in GDP, the change in the CAPB ratio and the 
narrative fiscal measures. Thus, lagged output and past cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
also affect the current cyclically-adjusted primary balance. This specification also includes two 
lags and a full set of country and time effects. Consistent with the tested exogeneity of the 
historical episodes of the fiscal consolidations and the TSLS estimation in the single equation 
approach, the narrative measures are ordered first in the VAR and the CAPB second, allowing 
it to have a contemporaneous effect on output (the last variable in the system equation) when 
considering a Cholesky orthogonalisation of the residuals. 
The estimation results under the three single equation specifications are shown in 
Table 2. The first column presents the fiscal multipliers in the OLS case with fixed effects, the 
second column the results with the TSLS estimator and the third column the results with the 
GMM estimator. We show the effect of a 1% change of fiscal consolidation in GDP, at the 
time of the consolidation, and calculate the dynamic response function one year later.  
Table 2. Estimated dynamic output effect of a 1% CAPB change: 
single equation specification 
Equation:  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡+ ∑ 𝛾𝑠∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑠2𝑠=1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑠∆𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑠2𝑠=0 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
Panel 1 shows the results for the period 2009-2014, after the great recession, with 
the full set of 25 countries. The OLS estimator shows an effect of -0.69 pp one year after the 
consolidation. The effect is statistically significant and after that period the responses on 
output stabilise. In column 2, CAPB is instrumented with the narrative measures.6 The effect 
after one year is a highly significant 1.95 pp, almost three times more than with the OLS. As 
expected, the GMM estimator lowers the calculated fiscal multiplier to 0.96 pp.7
In Panel 2 we report the results with a smaller sample of countries (15 instead of 25) 
for the period 1978-2009, given our interest in comparing the fiscal consolidation effects after 
the financial crisis with the international episodes before 2009. The estimates reproduce the 
stark differences between OLS and TSLS found by Guajardo et al. (2014):
 
8
                                                                            
6. The F-test of the first-stage has a p-value of less than 0.05 in all the equations, reinforcing the explanatory power of 
our narrative measures on CAPB. 
 the positive OLS 
estimate (0.24) with the CAPB measure is consistent with the “expansionary austerity” found 
previously in the literature; the instrumental estimate with the narrative shocks is negative  
(–0.87) and significant. Note that this discrepancy between estimation methods was not 
present when studying only the crisis period in Panel 1.   
7. The Hansen test (p-value=0.331) provides further evidence of the exogeneity of our instruments. 
8. The sample comprises the same 15 countries as in Section 2. 
OLS TSLS GMM Observations
-0.691 -1.951 -0.961
[0.221]*** [0.521]*** [0.23]***
0.246 -0.871
[0.121]** [0.335]***
0.138 -1.180
[0.115] [0.33]***
-1.560
[0.467]***
Note: Country and time-fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in brackets
445
520
520
Accumulated output effect after one year. The instruments in the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation are the narrative fiscal measures. In panel (4) 
the instruments are the narrative fiscal revenue measures. In the GMM specification, narrative measures are included as external instruments and the 
second lags of GDP and CAPB are used as GMM instruments (18 instruments in total). 
150
(2)
(1)
---
---
------
1978-2009 (15 countries)
2009-2014 (25 countries)
1978-2014 (15 countries)
(4)
(3)
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In Panel 3 the analysis is extended to include the crisis period. The qualitative results 
are maintained, but the short-term effects on real activity are larger (–1.18 with TSLS). This is 
primary evidence that the contractionary effect of consolidations was larger in depressed 
environments and is consistent with recent findings that have stressed the relevance of the 
state of the economy when measuring the size of fiscal multipliers (e.g. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012).  
Finally, in Panel 4, we use the CAPB only with the narrative measures from the 
revenue side. This is based on the idea that the main motivation for tax changes, usually 
implemented through new legislation, may be to reduce the inherited fiscal deficit, whereas 
expenditure changes may respond more to other developments affecting output. The 
estimated fiscal multiplier in the TSLS estimation (-1.56) supports the possibility of a 
downward bias towards zero in the above multipliers because the expenditure measures are 
less exogenous than the revenue ones, which is consistent with the exogeneity test shown in 
Section 2. 
Figure 5. Responses of output to a narrative fiscal shock:  
1978-2009 vs. 1978-2014 
 
Note: All specifications contain a full set of country and time-fixed effects. The shock on output is an orthogonalised 
narrative fiscal innovation, normalised to 1% of CAPB. Dashed lines represent one-standard-deviation confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 5 depicts the impulse response function from the benchmark VAR 
specification together with one-standard deviation confidence bands.9
                                                                            
9. The Akaike information criterion pointed to a lag structure with two lags.  
 The size of the shock 
on the narrative fiscal measures is normalised to generate a response on impact (t = 0) of 1% 
of GDP on the CAPB. That allows the VAR response to be comparable with the single 
equation results. We can see first that fiscal consolidation has a significant negative effect on 
output. Second the chart shows that the response is more contractionary when the 
international sample includes the most recent period after the financial crisis. And lastly, it is 
clear that the real response to the fiscal shock is more persistent with the full sample, since 
there is a stronger tendency for output to return to normal when the sample ends in 2008. 
 
-4.00%
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-1.00%
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Table 3 shows the value of the output response after one year and the 
corresponding standard error in the VAR. Together with the accumulated response of output 
to a narrative shock we report the fiscal multipliers both in the short and the long run, 
calculated as the accumulated response of output divided by the accumulated response of 
CAPB. The results shown for the two sample periods (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3) coincide 
with the instrumental variable estimation in the single equation specification: there is a 
significant contractionary effect of fiscal consolidation and that effect is larger when 
considering the most recent period.  
Table 3. Response of output to a narrative fiscal shock: VAR specification 
 
 
In order to test for parameter stability in the more recent period, we perform a test of 
whether overall parameter values are unchanged after and before 2009, when we think it may 
exist a break date. Against this background, we perform a sample-split test by introducing in 
the VAR model an interacted dummy variable in the right-hand side of all the regressions, and 
we compute our structural break statistic as in Sims (1980): 
 (𝑇 − 𝑘) log|Σ𝑟𝑒| − log|Σ𝑢𝑛|                                                    (3) 
 
Where T is the number of observations, k is the number of regressors and Σ𝑟𝑒 and  
Σ𝑢𝑛 are the residual covariance matrices for the restricted and the unrestricted model. 
Under the null hypothesis of parameter stability, the test statistic is asymptotically chi-
squared with the degrees of freedom equal to the total number of constraints. The value of 
the statistic 𝜒2(18) = 42.88 corresponds to a significance level below 0.005, rejecting the 
null. However, this result could be driven by the important economic changes (and not just 
fiscal) as a consequence of the crisis. In order to check if the fiscal variables are drivers of 
the structural change, we have corroborated that the coefficient of the dummy variable 
interacted with the narrative consolidations is negative and significant in the regression with 
GDP on the left-hand side. 
We also test the robustness of our findings by increasing the VAR information set. 
The fiscal consolidation periods are in many cases related to situations of large public debt 
and/or financial stress combined with other macroeconomic imbalances that may be 
perceived as affecting sovereign risk. In order to control for such factors we have considered 
two additional variables, namely government debt to GDP in the previous period and an index 
Benchmark VAR Benchmark VAR
Additonal variable: 
debt
Additional variables: 
debt, sovereign rating 
index
1978-2009 1978-2014 1978-2014 1978-2014
-1.715 -2.076 -2.366 -2.159
[0.420]*** [0.343]*** [0.432]** [0.564]***
Fiscal multiplier (after one year) -1.004 -1.143 -1.352 -1.220
Fiscal multiplier (after four years) -0.731 -0.989 -0.969 -0.900
Observations 445 520 406 391
Robust standard errors are obtained using Monte Carlo simulation.
Response of output to a shock of 1% of CAPB
All specifications contain a full set of country and time-fixed effects. The shock on output is an orthogonalised narrative fiscal innovation. The accumulated output 
response is after 1 year. The fiscal multiplier is the ratio between the cumulated effect on output and the cumulated effect on GDP
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of the sovereign ratings10
Figure 6. Responses of output to a narrative fiscal shock:  
1978-2009 vs. 1978-2014 
 that are included at the end in the ordering of the VAR. Figure 6 
presents the impulse response function from the 5-variable VAR specification. The greater 
real effect when considering the most recent sample period is more evident when controlling 
for financial and fiscal variables. 
 
Note: All specifications contain a full set of country and time-fixed effects. The shock on output is an orthogonalised 
narrative fiscal innovation, normalised to 1% of CAPB. 5-variable VAR includes lagged debt and sovereign rating 
index. Dashed lines represent one-standard-deviation confidence intervals. 
Table 3 presents the fiscal multiplier effects in the extended sample period (columns 
3 and 4). The results are robust to the inclusion of these variables since the short-run fiscal 
multiplier stays around 1.2%, a value similar to that obtained in the instrumental variable 
estimation and the 3-variable VAR. We see a slightly larger multiplier in the short run when 
controlling for public debt, consistent with the results in Burriel et al. (2009). 
3.2 The composition effect 
The standard literature that supports “expansionary fiscal contractions” has emphasised the 
role of composition (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). Their evidence shows that fiscal 
adjustments based on spending cuts are more effective than tax increases in stabilising the 
debt ratio and avoiding economic contraction. The approach has been to identify historical 
cases of fiscal retrenchment, looking at the cyclically-adjusted changes in fiscal variables. 
Here we investigate the relevance of composition by including the narrative fiscal 
expenditure and revenue measures in the previous VAR framework.11
                                                                            
10. The variable is taken from Broto and Molina (2014). 
 We consider both sets 
of measures at the same time given the importance of consolidations involving both 
expenditure and revenue measures, in order to account for the combined effect. In the 4-
variable VAR, revenue and expenditure are first and second in the order of the system, which 
is consistent with our exogeneity evidence in Section 2. As a robustness exercise we also 
report the output responses in a 6-variable system that includes the debt ratio and the 
sovereign rating index. 
11. CAPB data for revenue and expenditure to compare the VAR with the instrumental variable estimation is not 
available for all countries. 
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Figure 7 depicts the impulse response functions of revenue and expenditure shocks 
to output for the 4-variable and 6-variable VAR. We find a significant negative 
contemporaneous impact of the expenditure shock but, when we include the financial and 
fiscal controls, the shock only lasts for one year, returning to the baseline after two years. By 
contrast the revenue shock has a stronger impact contemporaneously on GDP and a much 
more persistent effect in both specifications.  
Figure 7. The response of output to narrative fiscal shocks: the 
composition effect 
 
Note: All specifications contain a full set of country and time-fixed effects. The shock on output is an orthogonalised 
narrative fiscal innovation, normalised to 1% of CAPB. 6-variable VAR includes lagged debt and sovereign rating 
index. Dashed lines represent one-standard-deviation confidence intervals. 
Table 4 confirms the previous results when taking into account the CAPB response 
and calculating the fiscal multiplier. After one year the expenditure multiplier (-0.67) is 
significantly smaller than the revenue multiplier (-1.54). Similarly, four years after the shock, 
the expenditure multiplier (-0.43) is much smaller than the revenue multiplier (-1.50). 
Interestingly, when the debt ratio and rating index variables are included in the VAR (column 2 
in Table 4) the differences between the two shocks increase since the responses to the 
expenditure shock are not significant after one year.   
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Table 4. Response of output to a narrative fiscal revenue/expenditure shock  
(1978-2014): VAR specification 
 
 
 
As in Guajardo et al. (2014), fiscal consolidations are contractionary even when they 
are based on spending cuts. But here we also find that for certain specifications expenditure 
adjustments are significantly different from revenue increases. Thus, these results are also 
consistent with Alesina et al. (2015) suggesting that expenditure cuts are less harmful for the 
economy than tax hikes. Similarly, Beetsma et al. (2015) report that consolidation affects 
consumer confidence negatively but more significantly through the revenue component than 
the spending component. 
The non-Keynesian view is that large fiscal adjustments, especially expenditure-
based ones, are more effective in avoiding economic downturns, based on the argument that 
cutting sensitive items such as transfer programmes or government consumption may signal 
a credible commitment to long-term debt reduction. To test that hypothesis we re-estimated 
the 4-variable VAR with the narrative revenue measures greater than 1% of GDP, and 0 
otherwise, and similarly for the narrative expenditure measures. We find nine cases where 
both variables detect a large consolidation; we also find 35 more cases of large expenditure 
consolidations and 18 cases of only large revenue consolidations. Of the total 71 cases of 
large consolidations, 23 were detected in the 2009-2014 period. However, given the limited 
number of observations, the following results should be treated with caution. 
Column 3 in Table 4 summarises the results. We find a significant negative response 
of large revenue-related fiscal consolidations, amounting to an output multiplier that stands at 
-2.1. The interesting result is in the effect of large expenditure-related consolidations. The 
effect after one year is negative but not different from zero. Specifically, we find that large 
expenditure consolidations, after a negative contemporaneous real effect, have a non-
significant effect after one year and onwards. Although the data limitation problem becomes 
more of a concern if we investigate this effect in the 1978-2009 period, it seems that both 
large expenditure-related and revenue-related consolidations are more contractionary when 
the recent crisis period is considered.  
Thus, consistent with the “expansionary fiscal contraction” literature, we find 
evidence that the composition of fiscal consolidation matters. The large expenditure-based 
Revenue
-2.990 -3.060 -3.561
[0.529]*** [0.730]*** [0.704]***
Fiscal multiplier (after one year) -1.545 -1.590 -2.117
Fiscal multiplier (after four years) -1.498 -1.354 -2.315
Expenditure
-1.111 -1.275 -0.839
[0.476]** [0.878] [0.51]*
Fiscal multiplier (after one year) -0.673 -0.753 -0.478
Fiscal multiplier (after four years) -0.434 -0.060 -0.260
Observations 520 391 520
Notes: see Table 3
Response of output to a shock of 1% of CAPB
Response of output to a shock of 1% of CAPB
4-variable VAR
Additional variables: 
debt, sovereign 
rating index
4-variable VAR 
(large 
consolidations)
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adjustments performed when considering the Great Recession have fiscal multipliers that are 
not significantly different from zero, whereas large revenue-related consolidations are highly 
contractionary and very persistent. 
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4 Extensions 
4.1 Monetary policy  
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy can greatly affect the size of fiscal 
multipliers. For example, in a Keynesian framework, monetary policy may react to fiscal 
consolidation episodes by reducing interest rates because inflationary pressures diminish. 
Moreover, under a Taylor-rule based monetary reaction, fiscal consolidation could produce a 
negative output gap, therefore leading to a drop in interest rates. Similarly, the probable 
response of the exchange rate could help to cushion the impact of fiscal retrenchment on 
domestic demand. However, as Christiano et al. (2011) have shown, the counteracting effect 
of monetary policy could be less noticeable in a context where the economy hits the zero 
lower bound (ZLB) of interest rates since the space for more accommodative policies is 
exhausted. 
Our sample includes an important period where the ZLB is present for most 
economies, and therefore we expect a weaker response of monetary policy to fiscal 
developments. Consequently, we anticipate a lower fiscal multiplier if we control for interest 
rates in the period previous to 2009. To check that out, a policy interest rate12
Table 5. Fiscal multipliers: the influence of monetary policy.  
VAR specification 
 is included in a 
4-variable VAR of fiscal consolidations, with the results presented in Table 5. The estimated 
multiplier, -1.0, is not very much affected by the inclusion of monetary policy rates, which is 
consistent with a less responsive monetary policy when the crisis period is considered. That 
result is even stronger when the debt ratio and the sovereign rating index are considered in 
the VAR. In that case, the short-run fiscal multiplier over -1.0 remains robust, while in the 
1978-2009 period the multiplier shrinks from -1.0 to less than -0.5.  
 
 
 
Thus, the ZLB on interest rates may have precluded the authorities from adopting a 
more accommodative monetary policy during the crisis that would have reduced the 
magnitude of the fiscal multipliers. Nevertheless, this analysis is largely limited by the inclusion 
of other variables reflecting the effects of non-conventional monetary policy actions after 2009 
in many of the countries of the sample. 
Another line of investigation was the role of monetary policy in relation to the 
composition of the fiscal adjustments. We have obtained (not shown) that the short-run 
multiplier of revenue consolidation is not affected if we include monetary policy in the 1978-
                                                                            
12. Policy interest rates for countries are taken from Datastream. 
4-VAR 6-VAR 4-VAR 6-VAR
-1.363 -0.691 -1.811 -1.953
[0.392]*** [0.488] [0.344]*** [0.515]***
Fiscal multiplier (after one year) -0.815 -0.486 -1.022 -1.132
Fiscal multiplier (after four years) -0.544 -0.164 -0.844 -0.864
Observations 420 298 495 520
Notes: see Table 3
Response of output to a shock of 1% of CAPB
1978-2009 1978-2014
With respect to the benchmark, 4-VAR includes an intervention interest rate. 6-VAR incorporates the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and the sovereign rating index.
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2014 period, while the expenditure multiplier is slightly reduced. This effect is stronger in the 
period 1978-2009, suggesting a more accommodative monetary policy stance for 
expenditure consolidations in the pre-crisis period, as suggested by the IMF (2010).  
4.2 Euro area countries 
Under financial stress, the confidence channel may be more present in fiscal consolidation, for 
several reasons. First, consolidation today could avoid more extensive and more harmful 
consolidation in the future, as in the model presented in Blanchard (1990); second, risk premia 
could be reduced by the consolidation, reflecting a lower financial risk of sovereign debt. 
We could test these hypotheses by restricting our sample to the stressed euro area 
countries that received external financial support after the crisis. However, given the low 
number of countries in that group, we prefer to focus on all the euro area economies.13
The results are summarised in Table 6. The one year multiplier is close to unity in the 
benchmark 3-variable VAR (column 1). This -0.98 multiplier is lower than the estimated -1.14 
for the whole sample (in Table 3).  However, if we include lagged debt and the sovereign 
rating index, the multiplier is greatly affected, becoming non-significant. This difference of 
estimates between specifications in the euro area contrasts with the more stable multiplier 
found for the whole sample.  
 
Although these economies had very different fiscal positions, the consolidations in the euro 
area took place in a more financially restricted environment, with higher debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Against this background, the probability of an unstable sovereign risk scenario was greater. 
Additionally, the euro area economies are also highly interconnected, so spillovers from a 
large number of countries pursuing a consolidation of public finances at the same time could 
impact significantly on the size of the fiscal multiplier for the whole group.  
Table 6. Fiscal multipliers: the euro area effect. VAR specification 
 
 
 
The estimation results are consistent with those of Guajardo et al. (2014), reported 
for a sample not including the recent crisis: fiscal consolidations preceded by high perceived 
sovereign default risk are less contractionary. Nevertheless, the estimation carried out in Table 
6, only for the euro area countries, presents some instability depending on the chosen 
specification and that may be due to the inclusion of the most recent years and the loss of 
observations after restricting the sample. 
                                                                            
13. The euro area countries in this sample are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. We consider the whole 1978-2014 period, although in the first part of that period each economy had its own 
independent monetary policy. 
Benchmark VAR Additional variables: debt, 
sovereign rating index
-1.656 -0.771
[0.442]*** [0.53]
Fiscal multiplier (after one year) -0.984 -0.457
Fiscal multiplier (after four years) -0.733 -0.201
Observations 345 252
Notes: see Table 3. The Euro Area economies included are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
Response of output to a shock of 1% of CAPB
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5 Conclusions 
We have examined the fiscal consolidation episodes that have taken place in a group of 
OECD countries after the global financial crisis (2009-2014). For that purpose we have 
constructed a dataset of policy actions – narrative approach – from a broad set of official 
documents. Compared with previous periods of fiscal consolidation, during this episode the 
average size of the adjustment was larger, with more countries consolidating at the same time 
and with a strong focus on tax measures.  
Using dynamic panel data estimation, we are interested in the short-term effects of 
fiscal consolidation on economic activity. The different specifications – from single equation to 
VAR systems – take into account the possible endogeneity of the regressors. Across all 
estimation methods the fiscal multiplier is negative and significant, in contrast to the results 
found previously with standard cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance measures. Moreover, the 
average output effect one year after the consolidation is between -1.0 and -2.0 pp of GDP, a 
higher multiplier than that found with historical episodes before 2009.    
We also obtain a significant real effect of revenue measures of around -1.6%, while 
expenditure consolidations have an effect close to -0.7%. These differences are even higher 
when looking at large consolidation episodes, with expenditure cuts having a non- significant 
effect after one year under certain specifications. This evidence showing the importance of 
the composition is closer to the expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis, since it supports 
the view that spending cuts are more effective in stabilising debt and avoiding economic 
downturns.  
In the last section we also present some evidence in favour of the need to consider 
non-conventional monetary policies to obtain a more accurate fiscal multiplier after the 
financial crisis and of the existence of a confidence channel for specific countries under 
financial stress that reduces the cost of fiscal consolidation. 
Lastly, we believe there are two other natural extensions of this paper that need to 
be pursued. First, the current fiscal consolidation episodes are still ongoing in many 
economies and it is not yet possible to determine whether they have been successful in 
stabilising and reducing high public debt ratios. Thus, more time observations will be needed 
to obtain a better assessment of this ongoing fiscal adjustment process. Second, our 
investigation has only disaggregated between revenues and expenditures. Efficiency 
arguments would also demand an analysis of current expenditure versus public investment 
and of direct versus indirect taxes 
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APPENDIX 1: TABLE A.1. NARRATIVE CONSOLIDATIONS 
 
  
Country Year Consolidation Revenue Expenditure
Australia 2012 0.3 0.2 0.1
Australia 2013 0.4 0.2 0.2
Austria 2011 0.7 0.4 0.3
Austria 2012 0.5 0.3 0.2
Austria 2013 0.7 0.2 0.5
Austria 2014 0.4 -0.1 0.5
Belgium 2010 0.4 0.1 0.3
Belgium 2011 0.5 0.2 0.3
Belgium 2012 1.9 1.1 0.8
Belgium 2013 0.9 0.5 0.4
Canada 2011 0.1 0.05 0.05
Canada 2012 0.1 0 0.1
Canada 2013 0.3 0.05 0.25
Canada 2014 0.5 0.1 0.4
Czech Repu 2010 2.6 1.7 0.9
Czech Repu 2011 1.6 0.8 0.8
Czech Repu 2012 1.4 0.8 0.6
Czech Repu 2013 1.1 0.8 0.3
Denmark 2011 1.3 0.4 0.9
Denmark 2012 0.5 0.3 0.2
Denmark 2013 1.1 0.4 0.7
Estonia 2009 9.2 3 6.2
Finland 2010 0.2 0.1 0.1
Finland 2011 0.6 0.7 -0.1
Finland 2012 0.3 0.3 0
Finland 2013 1.3 0.7 0.6
France 2011 0.9 0.4 0.5
France 2012 1.4 0.8 0.6
France 2013 2 1.4 0.6
France 2014 0.7 0.3 0.4
Germany 2011 0.6 0.1 0.5
Germany 2012 0.6 0.2 0.4
Germany 2013 0.4 0 0.4
Greece 2010 7.8 4.1 3.7
Greece 2011 2.6 1 1.6
Greece 2012 3.5 2 1.5
Greece 2013 1.6 0.7 0.9
Hungary 2010 4.1 0.6 3.5
Hungary 2011 0.8 0 0.8
Hungary 2012 3.3 2.1 1.2
Hungary 2013 1 0.3 0.7
Ireland 2009 5.8 3.6 2.2
Ireland 2010 1 0.2 0.8
Ireland 2011 3.26 0.86 2.4
Ireland 2012 2 0.8 1.2
Ireland 2013 2 0.8 1.2
Ireland 2014 1.3 0.6 0.7
Italy 2011 1 0.4 0.6
Italy 2012 2.8 2.3 0.5
Italy 2013 0.8 0.2 0.6
Italy 2014 1 0 1
Country Year Consolidation Revenue Expenditure
Latvia 2009 9.75 3.8 5.95
Latvia 2010 4.7 2.2 2.5
Latvia 2011 2.3 1.6 0.7
Latvia 2012 0.7 0.3 0.4
Lithuania 2009 7.4 1.6 5.8
Lithuania 2010 4.5 0.5 4
Lithuania 2011 1.9 0.1 1.8
Lithuania 2012 1.3 0 1.3
Mexico 2010 0.7 0.7 0
Mexico 2011 0.8 0.8 0
Mexico 2012 0.2 0.2 0
Netherlands 2011 1.8 0.2 1.6
Netherlands 2012 0.4 0.2 0.2
Netherlands 2013 2.1 1.1 1
Netherlands 2014 1 0.5 0.5
New Zealand 2011 0.4 0 0.4
New Zealand 2012 0.9 0 0.9
New Zealand 2013 0.9 0 0.9
New Zealand 2014 0.9 0 0.9
Poland 2010 0.6 0 0.6
Poland 2011 2.4 1.3 1.1
Poland 2012 0.5 0.3 0.2
Poland 2013 0.2 0.1 0.1
Poland 2014 0.1 -0.3 0.4
Portugal 2010 2.2 1.7 0.5
Portugal 2011 3.4 1.6 1.8
Portugal 2012 6 2.2 3.8
Portugal 2013 3.5 2.8 0.7
Portugal 2014 1.9 0.5 1.4
Slovakia 2011 1.9 1.1 0.8
Slovakia 2012 1 0.3 0.7
Slovakia 2013 3.9 2.6 1.3
Slovenia 2010 2.6 0 2.6
Slovenia 2011 0.7 0.1 0.6
Slovenia 2012 2.9 0.5 2.4
Slovenia 2013 2 1 1
Spain 2010 0.9 0.7 0.2
Spain 2011 2.1 0.5 1.6
Spain 2012 4 1.6 2.4
Spain 2013 3.5 2 1.5
Spain 2014 1.2 0.7 0.5
Turkey 2010 1 0.8 0.2
Turkey 2011 1 0.8 0.2
Turkey 2012 1 0.8 0.2
United Kingdo 2010 0.3 0.3 0
United Kingdo 2011 1.7 1.4 0.3
United Kingdo 2012 1.1 0.8 0.3
United Kingdo 2013 0.6 0.2 0.4
United States 2012 0.2 0.1 0.1
United States 2013 0.5 0.4 0.1
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APPENDIX 2: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES OF NARRATIVE EPISODES 
 
Australia: figures come from the measures announced in the “Mid Year Economic and 
Fiscal Outlook 2009-2010” http://www.budget.gov.au/2009-
10/content/myefo/download/MYEFO_2009-
10.pdf?bcsi_scan_9659b900cfc0c762=0&bcsi_scan_filename=MYEFO_2009-10.pdf (page 32), 
updated with data from OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”.  
Austria: For 2011, data come from the “Assessment of the national reform 
programme and stability programme for Austria of the European Commission” (hereafter, 
these documents will be referred as EC (Country) (Year)), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/recommendations_2011/swp_austria_en.pdf  
It states that (page 8): “At the end of December 2010, the Austrian parliament 
adopted a budget law for 2011, which contained a package of measures (amounting to 
around 0.75% of GDP) aimed at bringing Austrian public finances back to a sustainable path”.  
Analogously, 2012-2014 data comes from EC Austria 2013 and EC Austria 2014, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_austria_en.pdf (page 12) and 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_austria_en.pdf (page 9) 
Belgium: EC Belgium 2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/recommendations_2011/swp_belgium_en.pdf (page 7); 
EC Belgium 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_belgium_en.pdf (page 10) and , EC 
Belgium 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_belgium_en.pdf 
(page 12) complemented with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. 
Canada: our figures correspond with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public 
Finances”. 
Czech Republic: for 2010, we capture the data from OECD 2012 document 
“Restoring Public Finances”. For 2011 onwards, we rely on the EC Czech Republic 2012, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_czech_en.pdf (page 9) and EC 
Czech Republic 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_czech_en.pdf (page 11) 
Denmark: Our main source is EC Denmark 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_denmark_en.pdf (page 11) 
Estonia: although the OECD 2011 “Restoring Public Finances” calculated 
consolidation for 2009 and 2010, reviews of those figures increased the impact in 2009 and 
lowered the impact in 2010, as stated in OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”: 
“Compared to OECD 2011 “Restoring Public Finances” it seems that the cumulative 
consolidationefforts have been less than what was previously reported”. Therefore, we take 
the consolidation size from this last document. The phasing out of the measures is registered 
as negative consolidation for 2010, 2011 and 2012.  
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Finland: EC Finland 2011 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/recommendations_2011/swp_finland_en.pdf (page 6) 
and EC Finland 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_finland_en.pdf (page 11) complemented 
with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. 
France: Our main source is EC France 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_france_en.pdf (page 11) and EC France 
2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_france_en.pdf (page 14)  
Germany: From OECD 2011 document “Restoring Public Finances”: ”In June 2010, 
the government announced plans for an ambitious consolidation programme beginning in 
2011 that will help Germany meet its structural deficit target over the medium term. In 
addition to phasing out temporary fiscal stimulus measures, Germany announced a EUR 80 
billion consolidation programme”, which measures around 2,9% of average nominal GDP, 
which we distribute between the four years of the consolidation plan. However, several 
measures were not implemented. The European Commission stated in 2012 (EC Germany 
2012) that “In the light of the favourable budgetary development in 2011, the federal 
government decided not to implement additional measures to offset, for example, the fall in 
revenues from the nuclear fuel tax and delays in introducing a financial transaction tax”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_germany_en.pdf (page 8). We therefore 
reduce the revenue side of the consolidation plan. In 2013, more changes were introduced, 
especially in the expenditure side: “The favourable budgetary development and the positive 
trends in wages and employment have led the federal government to reduce taxes, social 
insurance contributions and fees. Overall, this is expected to provide businesses and citizens 
with cost cuts of nearly EUR 8 billion”, EC Germany 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_germany_en.pdf (page 10). By 2014, we 
could not find evidence of the continuation of the fiscal plan. 
Greece: a first package measures were announced in June 2009, with a total 
amount of around 1,2% of GDP (Annex B, page 62 in 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps/2009-
10/01_programme/el_2010-01-15_sp_en.pdf ). Moreover, additional measures were 
implemented in early 2010, as stated in the revision of the Stability Programme “The 
breakdown of the sources of the additional resources is the following: 1.1% additional 
revenues from changes in the tax system; 0.5% one-off taxation measures; 0.5% revenues 
from reducing tax evasion; 0.5% additional EU funds for the public investment programme.” 
(page 17) “The expenditure reduction is €1,825 million, or 0.74 percent of GDP” (page 20). In 
March, 2010, another set of measures amounting to 2% of GDP were implemented: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf  
“Shortly after a visit of Commissioner Rehn to Athens, Greece announces new deficit 
reducing measures of over 2% of GDP, including an increase in the VAT rates and other 
indirect taxes and a cut in the wage bill” (page 9). A revision of the fiscal consolidation path 
could be found in OECD 2012 “Restoring Public Finances” document. It acknowledges that 
“the consolidation process lost steam in 2011”. 
Hungary: EC Hungary 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_hungary_en.pdf (page 12) and EC 
Hungary 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_hungary_en.pdf (page 16) complemented 
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with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. We account for several one-off 
measures.  
Ireland: Measures present in the Memorandum of Understanding of 2010 are calculated 
to amount around 3.25% of GDP in 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-12-07-
mou_en.pdf (pages 1 and 2). We complement this source with OECD 2012 document 
“Restoring Public Finances” for 2012 and 2013. The budgetary measures for 2014 are 
provided in EC Ireland 2014 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_ireland_en.pdf (page 10) 
Italy: Our main source is EC Italy 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_italy_en.pdf (page 12) and EC Italy 2013, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_italy_en.pdf (page 15)  
Latvia: A review of fiscal consolidation in 2009 and 2010, with a detailed set of 
measures by year is provided in the “EC staff report from the 3rd review mission to Riga”, 
2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/balance_of_payments/pdf/staff_report_rig
a_mission_en.pdf (page 11), which complements the measures announced in 2009, and 
reviewed by the European Commission in the “Community balance of payments assistance, 
Latvia, 1st review linked to the 2nd installment”, 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/balance_of_payments/pdf/note_to_efc_lv
_bop_facility_1st_review_en.pdf 
After 2011, the consolidation effort was lowered as seen in EC Latvia 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_latvia_en.pdf 
Lithuania: fiscal consolidation in 2009 and 2010 amounted to around 12% of GDP, 
with 80% based on expenditure cuts, per several sources. A detailed overview of these 
measures could be found in Hawkseworth et al. (2010) “OECD Budgeting in Lithuania” 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/48170576.pdf. These calculation is broadly in line with 
Geng (2013) “Toward A Sustainable and Inclusive Consolidation in Lithuania: Past Experience 
and What is Needed Going Forward”, WP/12/157, IMF, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13157.pdf. For 2012 and onwards, data is 
extracted from EC Lithuania 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_lithuania_en.pdf, adjusted in 2013 and 
2014 because of a constitutional ruling against cuts in high wages and pensions. 
Mexico: our figures correspond with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public 
Finances”. 
Netherlands: the Stability Programme update of April 2011 provided a detailed set 
of measures from the Budget Memorandum and the Coalition Agreement in 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/cp_netherlands_en.pdf (pages 7 and 8). For 2012, 
2013 and 2014, we review the EC document “Analysis by the Commission services of the 
budgetary situation in the Netherlands following the adoption of the council recommendation 
to the Netherlands of 2 December 2009 with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an 
excessive government deficit“, available at  
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http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/other_docum
ents/2013-05-29_nl_126-7_commission_-_swd_en.pdf (page 7) and EC Netherlands 2014 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_netherlands_en.pdf (page 12). 
New Zealand: our figures correspond with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public 
Finances”. 
Poland: EC Poland 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_poland_en.pdf (page 10), and EC Poland 
2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_poland_en.pdf (page 10) 
complemented with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. 
Portugal: fiscal consolidation in 2010 and 2011 is calculated using OECD 2012 
document “Restoring Public Finances”. For 2012 and 2013, we use “Analysis by the 
Commission services of the budgetary situation in the Netherlands following the adoption of 
the council recommendation to Portugal of 9 December 2012 with a view to bringing an end 
to the situation of an excessive government deficit“ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/other_documen
ts/2013-05-29_pt_126-7_commission_-_swd_en.pdf (page 7), and EC Portugal 2014, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_portugal_en.pdf (page 10). 
Slovakia: EC Slovakia 2012, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_slovakia_en.pdf (page 9) and EC Slovakia 
2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_slovakia_en.pdf (page 12)  
Slovenia: EC Slovenia 2012, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_slovenia_en.pdf (page 10), EC Slovenia 
2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_slovenia_en.pdf (page 
16) and EC Slovenia 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_slovenia_en.pdf (pages 10 and 11) 
complemented with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. 
Spain: EC Spain 2012, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2012_spain_en.pdf (page 11), EC Spain 2013, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_en.pdf (page 16) and EC 
Spain 2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_spain_en.pdf 
(pages 10 and 11) complemented with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public Finances”. 
Turkey: our figures correspond with OECD 2012 document “Restoring Public 
Finances”. 
United Kingdom: our figures are similar to those in OECD 2012 document “Restoring 
Public Finances”, complemented with the information in the 2010 Budget and Riley et al. (2014) 
“Crisis and consolidation in the public finances”, Working Paper no.7, Office for Budget 
Responsibility http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/WorkingPaper7a.pdf  
United States: fiscal consolidation is calculated as the impact of the Budget Control 
Act as measured by the CBO, and amounts to roughly 0,7% of GDP, see 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/123xx/doc12357/budgetcontrolactau
g1.pdf , Table 1). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1401  TERESA SASTRE and FRANCESCA VIANI: Countries’ safety and competitiveness, and the estimation of current 
account misalignments.
1402  FERNANDO BRONER, ALBERTO MARTIN, AITOR ERCE and JAUME VENTURA: Sovereign debt markets in turbulent 
times: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects.
1403  JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ROCÍO PRIETO: The structure of sub-national public debt: liquidity vs credit risks.
1404  BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL and MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN: Measuring bank competition in China: 
a comparison of new versus conventional approaches applied to loan markets.
1405  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: 
disaggregated evidence for Spain.
1406  MARIYA HAKE, FERNANDO LÓPEZ-VICENTE and LUIS MOLINA: Do the drivers of loan dollarisation differ between 
CESEE and Latin America? A meta-analysis.
1407  JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO and ALBERTO URTASUN: Price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish economy: a microeconomic 
perspective.
1408  FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, ANTONIO MONTESINOS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and A. JESÚS 
SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES: Fiscal policies in Spain: main stylised facts revisited.
1409  MARÍA J. NIETO: Third-country relations in the Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution 
of credit institutions.
1410  ÓSCAR ARCE and SERGIO MAYORDOMO: Short-sale constraints and fi nancial stability: evidence from 
the Spanish market.
1411  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS and ILIANA REGGIO: Consumption in the shadow of unemployment.
1412  PAUL EHLING and DAVID HAUSHALTER: When does cash matter? Evidence for private fi rms.
1413  PAUL EHLING and CHRISTIAN HEYERDAHL-LARSEN: Correlations.
1414  IRINA BALTEANU and AITOR ERCE: Banking crises and sovereign defaults in emerging markets: exploring the links.
1415  ÁNGEL ESTRADA, DANIEL GARROTE, EVA VALDEOLIVAS and JAVIER VALLÉS: Household debt and uncertainty: 
private consumption after the Great Recession.
1416  DIEGO J. PEDREGAL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-FUENTES: A toolkit to strengthen government 
budget surveillance.
1417  J. IGNACIO CONDE-RUIZ, and CLARA I. GONZÁLEZ: From Bismarck to Beveridge: the other pension reform in Spain.
1418  PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, GERRIT B. KOESTER, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and CHRISTIANE NICKEL: 
Signalling fi scal stress in the euro area: a country-specifi c early warning system.
1419  MIGUEL ALMUNIA and DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ: Heterogeneous responses to effective tax enforcement: 
evidence from Spanish fi rms.
1420  ALFONSO R. SÁNCHEZ: The automatic adjustment of pension expenditures in Spain: an evaluation of the 2013 
pension reform.
1421  JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE and CARLOS THOMAS: Structural reforms in a debt overhang.
1422  LAURA HOSPIDO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The public sector wage premium in Spain: evidence from 
longitudinal administrative data.
1423  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: The Two Greatest. Great 
Recession vs. Great Moderation.
1424  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and OLIVER ROEHN: The impact of fi nancial (de)regulation on current account balances.
1425  MAXIMO CAMACHO and JAIME MARTINEZ-MARTIN: Real-time forecasting US GDP from small-scale factor models.
1426  ALFREDO MARTÍN OLIVER, SONIA RUANO PARDO and VICENTE SALAS FUMÁS: Productivity and welfare: an 
application to the Spanish banking industry.
1427  JAVIER ANDRÉS and PABLO BURRIEL: Infl ation dynamics in a model with fi rm entry and (some) heterogeneity.
1428  CARMEN BROTO and LUIS MOLINA: Sovereign ratings and their asymmetric response to fundamentals.
1429  JUAN ÁNGEL GARCÍA and RICARDO GIMENO: Flight-to-liquidity fl ows in the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
1430  ANDRÈ LEMELIN, FERNANDO RUBIERA-MOROLLÓN and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: Measuring urban agglomeration. 
A refoundation of the mean city-population size index.
1431  LUIS DÍEZ-CATALÁN and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Contract staggering and unemployment during the Great Recession: 
evidence from Spain.
1501  LAURA HOSPIDO and EVA MORENO-GALBIS: The Spanish productivity puzzle in the Great Recession.
1502  LAURA HOSPIDO, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA and GEMA ZAMARRO: Finance for all: the impact of fi nancial literacy training 
in compulsory secondary education in Spain.
1503  MARIO IZQUIERDO, JUAN F. JIMENO and AITOR LACUESTA: Spain: from immigration to emigration?
1504  PAULINO FONT, MARIO IZQUIERDO and SERGIO PUENTE: Real wage responsiveness to unemployment in Spain: 
asymmetries along the business cycle.
1505  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and NUNO GAROUPA: Litigation in Spain 2001-2010: Exploring the market 
for legal services.
1506  ANDRES ALMAZAN, ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER and JESÚS SAURINA: Securitization and banks’ capital structure.
1507  JUAN F. JIMENO, MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Employment protection legislation 
and labor court activity in Spain.
1508 JOAN PAREDES, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIRÓS: Fiscal targets. A guide to forecasters?
1509 MAXIMO CAMACHO and JAIME MARTINEZ-MARTIN: Monitoring the world business cycle.
1510 JAVIER MENCÍA and ENRIQUE SENTANA: Volatility-related exchange traded assets: an econometric investigation.
1511 PATRICIA GÓMEZ-GONZÁLEZ: Financial innovation in sovereign borrowing and public provision of liquidity.
1512  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and MARCOS MARCHETTI: The bank lending channel of unconventional monetary policy: 
the impact of the VLTROs on credit supply in Spain.
1513  JUAN DE LUCIO, RAÚL MÍNGUEZ, ASIER MINONDO and FRANCISCO REQUENA: Networks and the dynamics of 
fi rms’ export portfolio.
1514  ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ: Default near-the-default-point: the value of and the distance to default.
1515  IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAVIER VALLÉS: Fiscal consolidation after the Great Recession: the role of composition.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
